Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed: A Critical Exploration of Generic Approaches to Post-War Reconstruction by Llamazares, Monica
Centre for Conflict Resolution              Working Paper 14
Department of Peace Studies
Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed




DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES
Other Titles in this Series
International Conflict Resolution: Some Critiques and a Response
Tom Woodhouse, June 1999 Working Paper 1
The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses - The Case of Sri Lanka
Sunil Bastian, September 1999 Working Paper 2
International Non-Government Organisations and Peacebuilding - Perspectives from Peace Studies
and Conflict Resolution
Nick Lewer, October 1999 Working Paper 3
From Conflict Resolution toTransformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia
A. B. Fetherston, April 2000 Working Paper 4
Women, Gender and Peacebuilding
Donna Pankhurst, August 2000 Working Paper 5
Psychological 'Conflict Mapping' in Bosnia & Hercegovina: Case Study, Critique and the Renegotiation
of Theory
Steve Gillard, October 2000 Working Paper 6
Confronting Ethnic Chauvinism in a Post-War Environment: NGOs and Peace Education in Bosnia
Laura Stovel, December 2000 Working Paper 7
Developing an Online Learning Pedagogy for Conflict Resolution Training
Laina K. Reynolds & Lambrecht Wessels, May 2001 Working Paper 8
Citizenship Education or Crowd Control? The Crick Report and the Role of Peace Education and
Conflict Resolution in the New Citizenship Curriculum
Catherine Larkin, July 2001 Working Paper 9
"All You Need is Love"... and What About Gender? Engendering Burton's Human Needs Theory
Cordula Reimann, January 2002 Working Paper 10
Operationalising Peacebuilding and Conflict Reduction. Case Study: Oxfam in Sri Lanka
Simon Harris and Nick Lewer,  August 2002 Working Paper 11
Community Peace Work in sri Lanka: A Critical Appraisal
Dileepa Witharana,  October 2002           Working Paper 12
NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo
Monica Llamazares and Laina Reynolds Levy,  December 2003 Working Paper 13
Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed





1. Introduction   1
2. What is post-war peacebuilding?   2
3. Converging definitions of post-war peacebuilding: The emergence of a
theoretical post-war peacebuilding model   3
3.1. What kind of peace should be built?   4
3.2. What sources of conflict should the intervention address?   6
3.3. Who should guide the intervention? 10
3.4. What level of the intervention should drive the process? 12
3.5. What activities constitute post-war peacebuilding? 14
3.6. When and for how long should post-war peacebuilding happen? 19
   3.7. Problematising this consensus 20
4. Converging post-war peacebuilding policy: The emergence of a post-war
peacebuilding community 21
4.1 Organisational overview: Some examples of convergent peacebuilding
policy 23
4.2. Explaining organisational convergence around post-war peacebuilding:
Why is this happening? 26
4.3. Exploring the process of organisational convergence: How is this
happening? 27





Monica Llamazares is a final year PhD researcher working on: The Challenges to Building Peace in
Kosovo: A Critical Study of  International Approaches to Post-War Peacebuilding with Special
Reference to the Return and Integration of Refugees and IDPs of Kosovo.  She is also a consultant
for a UK FCO-funded study of peacebuilding and inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo with CARE International
and the Collaborative for Development Action.
(m.llamazares@bradford.ac.uk)
Summary:
Peacebuilding, as a remedy for all the ailments afflicting any society emerging from war, has placed
this complex and overloaded concept at the centre of a growing network of actors engaged in its
formulation and implementation. This paper critically examines the implications of a growing
convergence in definitions and approaches amongst this ‘international post-war peacebuilding
community'.
iii
The observations, views and interpretations expressed in this paper are those of the author.
Responsibility for the content of Working Papers rests with the authors alone.
This series of papers represents work in progress. Our objective is to share current research as
quickly as possible with a wide academic and practitioner community. The papers do not represent
finished projects or debates. Authors welcome feedback and comment.
The editor welcomes submissions to the Centre for Conflict Resolution Working Paper series. Please
contact: Dr Nick Lewer. Tel: 01274 234192; E-mail: n.lewer@bradford.ac.uk
Papers are available from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP,





1.  Introduction 
 
The growth in conflict resolution Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as the 
increasing addition of conflict resolution dimensions to development and humanitarian programs 
suggests that the chances of building peace from the rubble of war are now more achievable than 
ever (Jacobsen & Brand-Jacobsen, in Galtung, 2002, p.27). The linkages between positive peace, 
human security and development are no longer confined to critical voices from the field and 
academia, but very much part of the mainstream and increasingly entering the discourse of IR. 
Further still, these terms have been widely used in formulating a global security policy that is at 
present controversially centred around the ‘war on terror’.  
 
This phenomenon has brought closer diverse actors such as the UN and its Agencies, donor 
Governments, global financial institutions, international and local NGOs, the military, peace and 
conflict research institutions and the private sector, who arguably constitute what is here referred 
to as an ‘international post-war peacebuilding community’. The apparent convergence of 
international post-war peacebuilding efforts and academic enquiry is however not unproblematic. 
It calls for investigation of the implications of such a development. Questions must be asked as to 
whether the aforementioned trend translates into more effective approaches to post-war 
peacebuilding and more successful interventions.  
 
The aim of this Paper is thus two-fold. First it critically explores the emergence of an 
‘international post-war peacebuilding model’ in the efforts by the above-mentioned ‘community’ 
to define and implement a cohesive reconstruction 'package' that include peace and sustainable 
development as core aims. Secondly, this Paper attempts to guide future research and policy 
towards a more reflexive and principled enquiry, conceptualisation, and implementation of post-





by the UN, which is often a departure point for both research and policy making, to begin 
deconstructing the term and its meaning(s), and to attempt to find a more useful characterization. 
Section 3 critically examines the post-war peacebuilding literature to find evidence of an 
emerging theoretical model of what constitutes ‘good’ post-war peacebuilding. Section 4 turns to 
organisations involved in post-war reconstruction to find evidence of this consensual model being 
applied, while exploring the context in which this conceptual and practical convergence around 
post-war peacebuilding has taken place. The conclusion will summarise the implications of such a 
convergence, and suggest a re-conceptualisation of post-war peacebuilding to reclaim its 
transformational role.   
   
2. What is post-war peacebuilding?  
The UN’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace defines ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as the 
“comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace 
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending 
civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of 
order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and 
training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human 
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal 
processes of political participation” (Boutros-Ghali, UN, 1995).   
 
Organisational, academic, and practitioner contributions to its conceptual and practical 
dimensions have expanded upon the above definition (See sections 3, 4, 5 below). Post-war 
peacebuilding is now generally understood to be more than just a label to describe a project or 
programme, to imply that an intervention promotes positive peace through the activities 





Reynolds Levy, 2003). The term peacebuilding can be used to describe a varied set of activities or 
programmes, the manner that these programmes are implemented as well as their potential 
outcomes. It further encompasses efforts undertaken at different levels of the intervention and 
implemented by different actors (Lewer, 1999, p.12).  The inclusion of so many activities, levels 
and actors under the umbrella term peacebuilding has rendered its definition so broad that it is in 
danger of becoming meaningless.  
 
The key question then is not what post-war peacebuilding is, but what it can be. If the answer is 
‘just about every activity or policy that it’s undertaken to reconstruct a war-torn society’, then we 
need to sharpen its meaning(s) to make ‘peacebuilding’ a useful operative term for 
implementers/practitioners, beneficiaries and evaluators/commentators alike. However, one key 
aspect that remains central to the pursuit of peace is the principles underpinning assumptions, 
intentions and desired outcomes. Post-war peacebuilding is not only about activities, methods and 
impacts, but also about the intentions driving the intervention, in what must necessarily be a 
multi-dimensional conceptualisation of policy and implementation. The following enquiry into 
both the theoretical and organisational definition of post-war peacebuilding will help us identify 
the implicit messages of a growing consensus.  
 
3.  Converging definitions of post-war peacebuilding: The emergence 
of a theoretical post-war peacebuilding model 
Any exploration of academic definitions of post-war peacebuilding necessarily draws from a 
variety of fields, including economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
peace and conflict research, reflecting and contributing to the multi-disciplinary nature of both the 
theory and practice of peacebuilding. A discernable consensus about post-war peacebuilding can 





whether such a convergence amounts to the emergence of a dominant post-war peacebuilding 
blueprint at the theoretical level, and the nature of this ‘model’.  
 
The abundant definitions of post-war peacebuilding offered by the relevant literature are 
characterised by an attempt in each case to answer questions such as: What kind of peace should 
be built? What sources of conflict should the intervention address? Who should guide the 
peacebuilding intervention? What level of the intervention should drive the peacebuilding 
process? What activities constitute peacebuilding? When and for how long should peacebuilding 
happen? These questions will offer the framework for discussion below. 
 
3.1.  What kind of peace should be built?  
An important departure point for most debates is the differentiation between negative and positive 
peace introduced by Johan Galtung (1975), which still underpins the distinction between narrow 
and broad approaches to peacebuilding. Furthermore, the often-tense relationship between 
negative peace promoting activities, and those undertaken to promote a positive peace has shaped 
many debates around what constitutes ‘good peace-building practice’.  
 
Galtung (1975, quoted in Miall et al 1999, p.187) defined peacebuilding as encompassing the 
practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction 
and development. In his latest contribution peacebuilding is re-defined as part of ‘third 
generation’ of peace approaches evident after the Cold War, when a reaction against simplistic 
approaches to building peace finally recognised the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its links to 
development. Galtung argues that issues of culture, human needs, and ‘fault-lines of the human 
condition such as gender’ have now entered the peace debate and are recognised as crucial 





The concept of positive peace is closely linked to that of justice. Despite the consensus in the 
literature about the welcome move from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ peacebuilding approaches, some 
authors still position themselves differently within peace-justice debate. 
 
Baker (2001, p.759) identifies two ‘peacemaker profiles’ and attributes distinct approaches to 
both. For instance, whereas ‘conflict managers’ promote an inclusive approach, aim at 
reconciliation, employ a pragmatic focus, emphasise the process, engage local cultures and 
norms, presume the moral equivalence of the parties and assume a neutral role; ‘democratisers’ 
adhere to universal norms and values, employ an exclusive approach, aim for justice, emphasise 
the outcome, insist on moral accountability, believe justice to be non-negotiable, and relinquish 
their neutrality in favour of a principled stance. Baker places a current post-war intervention such 
as Kosovo firmly within the former (ibid, p.762), while Clapham blames the same approach as 
having precipitated the genocide in post-settlement Rwanda (1998).  
 
Clapham further criticises this increasingly conflict resolution influenced approach being 
employed by international peace-building interveners, as they bring conflict parties into 
precarious power-sharing agreements that ignore the power imbalances and thus become hard to 
sustain (ibid, p.195). Baker (2001, p.756) agrees that such power-sharing arrangements fail to 
reflect the power leverage brought by each of the conflict parties. Furthermore, it also fails to 
reflect responsibility for human right abuses and war crimes committed by the very leaders that 
sign up to the precarious peace that often follows civil wars.     
 
Ryan (1992, in Large, 1998, p.22) refers to peace without justice as “pacification” a situation 
where an unjust society is perpetuated through the suppression of violence. Rigby (2001, p.184) 





prime commitment should be to broaden and deepen the peace, before justice can be pursued. 
This does bring the peace process into tension with the very foundations of long-term 
reconciliation, namely truth, justice and ultimately forgiveness. However, the threat of recurring 
violence may force peacebuilders to pursue these values in sequential phases during a longer 
period of time that may be desirable (ibid, p.185). Woodhouse (1999) also responds to the critics 
of conflict resolution approaches to peacebuilding with an overview of voices (Curle, 1994; 
Featherston, 1998; Lederach, 1995; Nordstrom, 1992) that champion third party intervention as 
facilitating what must essentially be a ‘peacebuilding from below’ effort to chart more sustainable 
and locally owned paths to peace and justice.  
 
Despite the difference in emphasis attached to the values of truth, justice, reconciliation and their 
overall contribution to peace, all authors conclude that there is no prescriptive solution for all 
post-war situations; rather a balanced process must be undertaken that will in time allow societies 
to heal. The overall conclusion is that ‘positive’ post-war peacebuilding would facilitate not only 
socio-economic and political rehabilitation, but also promote social justice and reconciliation, a 
much deeper and transformational intervention and that the challenges faced must not detract 
from its pursuit.  
 
3.2.  What sources of conflict should the intervention address?  
Identifying the root causes of a particular conflict is a recommended first step for any 
intervention. This shapes the approach, methods, and tools employed. It is also an important 
departure point for most literature contributions to post-war peacebuilding debates.     
 
Criticism of international post-war peacebuilding from research and academia offer more or less 





engagement in post-war rehabilitation outright. The critiques are often recommendations to shift 
emphasis from one aspect of the intervention to another, in order to overcome identified post-
conflict ‘deficits’ (for example military/security, political/institutional capacity, economic/social 
debilitation, and psycho/social trauma) closely linked to ‘root causes’ of that conflict (Miall et al, 
1999, p.191). These ‘deficits’ offer the framework for the following literature overview.   
 
Maynard (1999 in Croker et al, 2001 p.705) points to the need to address insecurity as key to 
successful post-war peace-building, as it is vital that freedom of movement, absence of personal 
or group threats, and safe access to resources is achieved for all in the post-war setting to even 
hint at a movement towards healing and reconciliation. Schnabel (2002) believes that the core 
principles of conflict prevention must inform post-settlement peacebuilding to effectively avoid a 
re-lapse into war and make it sustainable thus emphasizing the military/security deficit.  
 
Stedman (2001, pp. 750-1) highlights the importance of keeping ‘peace spoilers’ in check through 
better intelligence and increased capabilities of deterrence in the military component of peace-
building missions. He prioritises the demobilisation of armies, reintegration of soldiers to civilian 
life, and the successful transformation of armies into political actors (ibid). Nicole Ball (2001, 
p.726) also believes that the reform of the security sector in support of good governance and 
equitable socio-economic development is key to the sustainability of peace-building efforts.  
 
Pugh (1995, 2000) leads the school of ‘developmentalist’ approaches to post-war peacebuilding, 
which point to poverty as the main source of conflict. He views socio-economic vulnerability as 
the main hindrance to local capacities to withstand political complex emergencies. He commends 
the UN for leading the way in expanding the conceptualisation of peacebuilding as a 





contribution of integrated social development approaches to post-war peacebuilding, and view the 
combination of ‘good governance, physical reconstruction, and economic and social 
development’ as a winning formula against the recurrence of violence in post-war settings. 
 
Most authors welcome the linkages between development and peace, but in response to the 
benign appraisal of this positive ‘link’, the following authors recognise this dominant trend but 
claim that it reinforces the system that led to the conflict in the first place. Duffield (1998, 2002) 
acknowledges that international post-settlement reconstruction is embracing conflict resolution 
and that there is a move towards more comprehensive approaches to building peace, but faults 
this approach for overlooking issues of ‘inequality, economic growth and resource distribution’. 
Duffield believes that peacebuilding normalises unjust situations by merely helping people to 
cope with the consequences of globalisation and ‘war economies’ (Duffield, 2000, pp.69-75). 
    
Berdal and Malone (2000, p.2) share Duffield’s concerns and believe that the political economy 
of civil wars, which they consider to be a key source of ‘protractedness’ in many of today’s 
conflicts, remains unchallenged by current peace-building approaches. Collier (2000, p.91, 105) 
supports the economic agendas of war as key sources of conflict in his “greed over grievance” 
debate, and suggests that good peacebuilding must reduce incentives for those benefiting from 
war in order to reduce their influence over the process. 
 
Paris (1997, p.57) warns of the need to acknowledge the underlying economic conditions that 
create the risk of violent conflict, and highlights the sometimes-worsening impact of peace-
building interventions. He criticises the practice of conditioning economic assistance to 





proposes a softer approach to market reform and structural adjustment, but a tougher stance on 
democratisation and institution building (2001, p.770). 
 
Other authors emphasize the political and institutional deficit as being the key for post-war 
interventions. Cousens and Kumar (2001, p.4) believe the ‘fragility or collapse of political 
processes and institutions’ to be the main catalyst for war, while Kumar (1998, p.7) argues that 
post-conflict elections would restore the loss of legitimacy of political institutions and processes, 
thus institutionalising a conflict resolution mechanism into the body politic. Their point is 
reinforced by Brown (1996, p. 17) who perceives a greater threat to peace from the political 
manipulation of, say, economic or social cleavages, than the cleavages themselves. However, the 
consensus is that a political intervention alone could not deliver peace and that a long-term 
process of rehabilitation in all spheres of society is necessary (Kumar, 1998, p.216). 
 
The last ‘deficit’ area to be addressed is the psychosocial dimension of conflict and its pervasive 
impact in the aftermath. Advocates of psychosocial healing view it as key to the internalisation of 
the peacebuilding process by afflicted populations. Rothstein (1999) points out: “[…] since there 
is obviously an important psychological or emotional component of protracted conflicts, there is 
[…] likely to be an equally important psychological or emotional component to their resolution” 
(ibid, p.239). Pugh (1995, p.18) believes that an emphasis on structural causes of conflict 
underplays the “[…] psychological, spiritual and cultural determinants of violence”, and that 
“[…] reconciliation between social groups previously at war, requires more than money”. While 
Ryan (1990) criticises neglect of the inter-personal and psycho-social dimensions of 
peacebuilding, linked to current approaches overlooking the grassroots as an important 






Psycho-social approaches to peace-building highlight the need to engage mechanisms to restore 
inter-personal and inter-communal relations to complement existing processes of reconstruction 
at all levels of the intervention, from leadership (Track I) to grassroots (Track III). This approach, 
like all others gathered in the above overview, are ultimately championed not in isolation but as 
complementary of other aspects of post-war reconstruction that must also be addressed to build a 
sustainable peace.  
 
In the debate of what sources of conflict must be prioritised in post-war peacebuilding 
interventions, ranging from material resource competition to perception and belief clashes, the 
conclusion must be that multiple causation calls for multi-dimensional interventions. The linkage 
between ‘peace-building deficits’ (Miall et al, 1999) is shared amongst most authors and point to 
comprehensive and integrated approaches to building peace that tackle both the symptoms and 
root causation of conflict. None advocate the tackling of their chosen area of intervention to the 
exclusion of all others. Most authors conclude their arguments with a call for ‘complementarity’, 
coordination between agencies to achieve it and the need to tackle both symptoms and root causes 
to build a sustainable peace. All agree to improve rather than abandon the international assistance 
to war-torn societies.     
 
3.3.  Who should guide the intervention?  
An important aspect of the debate about what constitutes good peacebuilding is that over who 
should lead the efforts to rebuild societies after war. The international community is taking its 
commitment to ‘exporting’ peace very seriously, but do those who ‘pay’ have the ultimate ‘say’? 
 
In his study of eight peace settlements, Hampson (1996, p.23) assessed the factors that made them 





settlement peacebuilding. Hampson studied the four factors determining success or failure of 
peace settlement implementation – 3rd party role, structural characteristics of the conflict itself, 
regional/systemic dynamics, and the settlement’s ‘ingredients, concluding that the greater 
resources and staying power a 3rd party could muster, the greater the chances of a peace 
agreement to deliver sustainable peace (ibid, pp.9, 210).      
 
Others place more emphasis in the ownership of the process by local constituencies to ensure 
sustainability. Large (1998) believes that the unique resources that local actors bring to the 
process makes it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. A successful peacebuilding 
intervention should enable “indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either 
expectations or packaged solutions” (ibid, p.157). Diamond (1999, pp.84-5) also believes that 
peace must be built “from the inside out” and that interventions may only hope to catalyse change 
that must be brought about by local peacebuilders. Finally Stiefel (in Barakat and Chard, 2002, 
pp.817-835) advocates local ownership that goes beyond participation to transfer control from 
donors to recipients as local solutions tend to be “more effective, cheaper and more sustainable” 
(ibid, p.827). 
 
This ‘peacebuilding from below’ has been criticised as being blind to social justice, when local 
‘unjust’ power structures are strengthened through the engagement of traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Amongst this view the gender critique exposes the term ‘local actors’ as 
highly problematic in masquerading inequalities between men and women that are obscured by 
such homogenising labels. Thus to the question of whether international or local actors should 
lead the post-war peacebuilding process, the gender dimension must be mainstreamed if a 





implementation can help avoid what Pankhurst and Pearce (1997) refer to as a ‘gendered peace’, 
where gender-blind interventions fail to adequately address women’s needs.  
 
The structures set up to implement post-war peace-building processes are often top-heavy, 
namely they concentrate both efforts and resources at the top level. Moreover, as has been 
identified by Uvin (2002), the trend towards greater coherence and coordination amongst 
international peacebuilding agencies further challenges the ownership of the process by local 
actors. Although this fact gives more prominence to outside interveners, the need for locally 
owned processes is generally accepted. The distinct but complementary resources that outside and 
inside actors can bring to a peacebuilding process are recognised by all authors. 
 
3.4.  What level of the intervention should drive the process?  
A further layer of debate in the choice of peace-building approaches and one closely linked to the 
previous debate about local participation is determined by the preferred level of intervention: 
Track 1, 2 or 3.   
 
Track 1 is the domain of official international diplomacy and government agencies, where 
political and military leaders operate. Havermans (1999, pp.134-5) praises the ability of official 
diplomacy to mobilise huge resources to entice or coerce, with ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’, the warring 
parties to negotiation. He points to the advantage of Track One over other channels due to the 
access by diplomats to the ‘most important players in a conflict’. Bercovitch (1991, pp. 7-17), in 
his study of mediation in international conflict, found that “[…] the leader of a government, 
possessing rank and prestige and having some ‘leverage’, has a better chance of mediating 






Jacobsen and Brand-Jacobsen (2002, pp.53, 74-75) criticise the focus on leaders as assuming that 
the appropriate representatives can be found, and that they will articulate and advocate the 
interests of their constituencies. This emphasis at the top may leave populations feeling isolated 
from the process, and thus top-level mediation must not be conducted in a ‘void’. Manning 
(2003) also highlights the challenges to implementation at the local level of a centrally agreed 
peace process. The lack of connectedness between the top and lower levels of the intervention 
must be overcome to make peacebuilding sustainable.       
 
Lederach (1997, pp.41-2) similarly proposes a multi-level approach to peacebuilding that 
increases inter-connectedness between levels of intervention and co-operation between actors 
involved. However, he points to Track Two leaders as key actors by virtue of their distance from 
the confrontational politics dominating top echelons of conflict-ridden societies. They have the 
potential to act as intermediaries between the top and grassroots levels. The involvement of all 
sectors of society in peace-building is also highlighted by van Tongeren (1999, pp.124-5) as a key 
aspect often overlooked by interveners. However, he identifies Track One and Track Two as the 
key levels whose linkage will increase the success of a peace process. 
 
Grassroots approaches include Alger’s (1991, in Large, 1998, p.23) who acknowledges the 
potential role of the population as ‘peacemakers’, or in this case ‘peace-builders’, without whose 
“knowledge, participation and support”, institutions “[…] cannot attain a strong and lasting 
peace”. Walker (1998, in Large 1998, p.23) highlights the potential for transformation by ‘critical 







Lewer and Rambsbotham (1993) suggest ‘multi-track’ diplomacy as an effective way to tackle 
‘ethnic and regional conflict’ whose complexity requires a ‘systems approach’ and the premise 
that change at the grassroots cannot be imposed from above. Similarly, Fisher and Keashly (1991, 
in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000, p.97) suggest a ‘multi-modal, multi-level approach’ in 
which different but complimentary activities are employed to tackle the multiple causation of 
‘inter-communal conflict’ at every level of the intervention.  
 
Those advocating the primacy of Track One actors favour a top-down approach to peacebuilding 
where official diplomacy leads the peace process. Those highlighting the importance of Track 
Two actors would champion a more inclusive mid-up and mid-down approach, where middle 
range leadership links top leadership efforts and the population. The sponsors of Track Three 
peacebuilding would emphasize the role of grassroots leadership in nurturing peace 
constituencies necessary to sustain the process, thus advocating a bottom-up approach. But just as 
the debate around root causes and appropriate actions, the ultimate conclusion is that whatever 
level is emphasized it should be complemented by action at all levels for a ‘holistic’ approach to 
building-peace where all levels are integrated in a complementary and mutually reinforcing 
process. 
 
3.5.  What activities constitute post-war peacebuilding?  
This overview of what activities are identified by authors as constituting peacebuilding is 
necessarily finite. However it offers a snapshot of a broadly defined peacebuilding ‘package’ that 
is shared by most.  
 
Miall et al (1999) complete their ‘deficit’ approach (see p. 5 above) with a set of activities to 





and demobilisation, consolidation of a national army and police, the final demilitarisation of 
politics and the transformation of culture of violence to ones of peace. The political-constitutional 
deficit during the initial phase is addressed by transitional governing measures, in the medium 
term by the organising of a crucial second election, and finally the consolidation of good 
governance and civil society. The socio-economic deficit is first tackled with humanitarian relief, 
then a period of rehabilitation of infrastructure, and finally stable long-term economic policies are 
implemented. The psycho-social deficit must first address the parties’ mistrust, then balance the 
priorities of peace and justice with long-term measures such as the healing of psychological 
wounds and reconciliation (ibid, p.203). 
 
Lederach (1997) proposes an intervention structure as a pyramid with the apex representing the 
top military, political and/or religious leadership; the middle level representing a mid-range 
leadership including sector, professional, ethnic or INGO leaders; and the grassroots leadership 
placed at the pyramid’s base. Each of the three ‘spaces’ contains activities to further the peace-
building process. For example at the top, high-level negotiations, cease-fire agreements and 
highly visible mediation would be used. Whereas at the middle level problem-solving workshops, 
conflict resolution training, and peace commissions would be better suited. Finally, a grassroots 
intervention may include local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction 
activities, and psychosocial work in post-war trauma recovery (ibid, p.39). 
 
Lund (2001, pp.17-8) offers a peace-building ‘toolbox’ with a long list of activities categorised 
under seven headings:  
 
 Official Diplomacy, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation, good offices, peace 





 Non-official Conflict Management Methods, supporting indigenous dispute resolution 
mechanisms, peace commissions, non-official facilitation and problem-solving workshops; 
 Military Measures, such as deterrence, restructuring and professionalisation of military 
forces, demobilisation/reintegration of ex-combatants, confidence-building and security, 
demilitarised zones, peace enforcement;  
 Economic and Social Measures, like humanitarian assistance, development assistance, 
economic reforms, inter-communal trade, private investment, agricultural programs, aid 
conditionality, economic sanctions;  
 Political Development and Governance Measures, including political party and institution 
building, election reform, support and monitoring, civic society development, training of 
officials, power-sharing arrangements, constitutional reform;  
 Judicial and Legal Measures, such as inquiry commissions, war crimes tribunals, 
judicial/legal reforms, arbitration, police reform, adjudication;  
 Communications and Education Measures, for example peace radio/TV, media 
professionalisation, journalist training, international broadcast, peace education, exchange 
visits, conflict resolution training.  
 
The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) has compiled the following 
Peacebuilding Activities Chart:   
 
 Conflict Resolution, such as community-based initiatives, second track diplomacy, mediation 
and negotiation;  
 Early Warning, for example intelligence and monitoring, data collection/analysis; Civilian 





 Environmental Security, such as conflict assessment and resolution in relation to source 
depletion, human migration, etc;  
 Physical Security, like demobilisation, disarmament, de-mining, protection of civilians, 
police/security reform;  
 Economic Reconstruction, infrastructure development, market reform, financial/economic 
institution-building, micro-enterprise, credit assistance;  
 Personal Security, targeting gender, sexual orientation and racial/cultural - specific  violence;  
 Human Rights, reporting/investigating, training, advocacy;  
 Institutional/Civil Capacity Building, government and NGO capacity building, 
implementation of peace accords, promotion of transparency/accountability;  
 Governance and Democratic Development, such as electoral assistance, civic education and 
training, judicial reform and training, media reform and training;  
 Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance, tackling basic needs (food, shelter, health, 
suffering);  
 Training, peace-building training in any of the other activities, training of trainers; Social 
Reconstruction, including psychosocial trauma, reintegration of refugees/IDPs/combatants, 
social services, peace education;  
 Policy Development, Assessment and Advocacy, like research, assessment/evaluation, 
lessons learned, public consultation (CCPC, 2003).         
 
Two important conclusions emerge from examining the above-collected sets. Firstly, there are 
many similarities in both the activities and the objectives they aim at achieving. For example all 
advise the improvement of physical security by activities such as demobilisation, disarmament, or 
the inclusion of as many societal sectors as possible in the intervention with a combination of aid, 





explicitly adhere to conflict resolution (problem-solving workshops, mediation, and conciliation) 
whereas others have the potential of doing so if applied in a conflict sensitive manner (economic 
reform, relief and development, social service provision). 
 
Although this debate is beyond the scope of this paper it is worth mentioning that the above sets 
of activities fall under two distinct but overlapping categories: those that do peacebuilding and 
those that contribute towards a wider peacebuilding process. The difference can be best 
understood as that between direct approaches - i.e. ‘stand alone’ conflict resolution interventions 
that make their objective explicit and indirect approaches - i.e. those attempting conflict 
transformation ‘by stealth’ through mainstreaming of peace-building (Atmar and Goodhand, 
2002, p.47). The former, a narrower conception of peacebuilding, may lack conceptual 
connectedness to the overall intervention by creating an isolated sphere of activity that only a 
minority of the population experience. Nonetheless, it remains a powerful reminder to both 
interveners and stakeholders that peace is what they are working towards. The latter, a broader 
conception of peacebuilding, suggests the interdependence of the diverse sources of conflict and a 
more integrated intervention. However, it may lack the explicit peace vision that Lederach has 
argued is needed to drive the process (Lederach, 2001, p.845).  
 
Having made the above clarification, the lists of activities found in the literature that both do 
and/or contribute towards peacebuilding have apparent and significant similarities, supporting the 









3.6.  When and for how long should post-war peacebuilding happen?  
Many authors follow the ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ peace continuum to divide the peace-building 
process into distinct phases. This type of incremental or gradual approach suggests that the setting 
must be ‘secured’ before other peace-building activities take place, namely that the hawks must 
‘boxed’ before the doves are ‘released’ (Last, 2000; Baker, 2001, p.763). Last (2000) suggests 
that while the ‘securing’ of the environment takes a more prominent role at the earliest stage of a 
peace-building mission, the positive peace-building tasks must begin simultaneously albeit in a 
‘catalytic and organising’ role. The incremental sequence is paralleled by the process of 
devolution of authority from internationals to locals, a process Last suggests may take place in 
three years (ibid, p.94). 
 
Paris (2001, p.780) problematises the focus on ‘dates’ suggesting that international organisations 
engaged in peace-building must revise their time frames to link them to the accomplishment of 
specific objectives instead. He advises that peace-building missions should last longer than the 
average three years, possibly for as long as ten. This vision coincides with Lederach’s “decade” 
thinking shifting from short-term to long-term approaches to peace-building interventions (2001, 
p.846). 
 
Lederach (1997) suggests that from the very beginning of the intervention a connection should be 
made to the overarching vision that will drive the process for generations (ibid, p.77). The final 
proposal is then to construct a ‘working matrix for developing an infrastructure for peace-
building’ that tackles first the crisis stage and issues for a period of 2-6 months; then the people 
and relationships for 1-2 years; then the institutions or sub-system for 5-10 years; and finally the 
vision of peace and desired future that all hope for and move towards and that will need work for 





Despite the difference of opinions about the length of time each phase of an intervention may 
take, there is a clear consensus about the need to implement an incremental approach the 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peacebuilding activities of post-settlement rehabilitation.  
 
3.7.  Problematising this consensus 
The trend amongst the above academic definitions of post-war peacebuilding is supportive of the 
need to build a positive peace from the rubble of war, including justice and equality. There is 
consistent support for interventions to address all ‘peace deficit areas’ of the setting, as multiple 
causes of conflict require multi-dimensional interventions. All support a cooperative endeavour 
between international and local actors that is in turn inclusive of all members of the intervened 
society, and although peacebuilding ‘gaps’ are pinpointed at different levels by different authors, 
the agreement is that a complementary multi-track intervention would strengthen vertical and 
horizontal ‘connectors‘ (Anderson, 1999).  
 
Most proposals display common elements to peacebuilding programs such as demobilisation, de-
mining, disarmament, establishment of international and local civilian police forces, rebuilding 
infrastructure, establishment of the rule of law and a working judiciary, institution-building, 
socio-economic rehabilitation, organising and supervising electoral processes, education and 
promotion of human rights, democratisation, capacity-building, and psycho-social healing. The 
overall consensus is the inherent ‘goodness’ of intervening in post-war societies to alleviate 
suffering, a premise that is controversially uncritical, and by proxy supportive, of the liberal 
democratic peace endeavour (Duffield, 2002; Paris, 2001, 2002; Richmond, 2004a, 2004b).   
 
A number of problematic issues arise from the convergence in defining best approaches to post-





. Too broad! A consensual definition of peacebuilding that diverse organisations can adhere to, 
cooperate over, or jointly evaluate, often represents the lowest common denominator. This results 
in broad definition and terminology that do not reflect the richness of peacebuilding activity, the 
implementation process or its impact and outcome.    
 
. Too generic! This consensual definition of peacebuilding, albeit broad, is becoming a dominant 
paradigm for interventions across the globe. However, it is being theoretically defined by mainly 
Western institutions. This has the potential to attribute universality to culturally situated values 
and assumptions.  
 
. Too dominant! The consensus built around one particular way of defining peacebuilding makes 
alternative definitions harder to take hold. Consensus can sometimes stifle critique. This is 
particularly relevant in negotiating shared international-local definitions of what peace to build, 
when dominant Western approaches leave little room for locally owned approaches to be 
articulated and incorporated into programs.  
 
. Too un-reflexive! The above reviewed academic enquiries into post-war peacebuilding address 
conflict causation, activities, actors, timing, aims, levels of intervention, but fail to question the 
assumptions, values, principles underpinning the interventions they support.   
 
4.  Converging post-war peacebuilding policy: The emergence of a 
post-war peacebuilding community 
During the 1990s international organisations involved in humanitarian relief and development 
responded to calls for more widespread grassroots participation in post-war peace processes by 





was partly driven by a recognition of the potential impacts of humanitarian aid on peace and 
conflict (Anderson 1999), and partly by the expansion of INGO relations with UN Agencies and 
military establishments, and an increasing formalisation of relations with their donor governments 
(Duffield 2002: 54). 
 
Post-war peacebuilding has now become the focus of both increasing resources and attention 
from international actors, including Government development agencies, the military, private 
sector, global financial institutions, International NGOs (INGOs), International Government 
Organisations (IGOs), local NGOs (LNGOs), as well as academia and research organisations. 
Although methods and strategies may differ, actors that have traditionally held clashing agendas 
are now sharing a conceptual and operational language, and, at least rhetorically, adhering to 
similar principles and aims, forming the basis of a growing international post-war peacebuilding 
community. 
 
A recent UNDP document observed that the past decade has been a period of significant 
institutional adaptation as the development community has turned its attention to crises with a 
renewed appreciation of how, individually and collectively, members can better assist countries 
emerging from violent conflict. These developments have opened up a host of new, different 
kinds of partnerships (UNDP, 2001, p.9). The World Bank, for example, once rarely operating in 
complex emergencies, is now active in places such as East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, 
operating with significant grant funds promoting ‘peace and reconciliation’ (World Bank, 2001, 
vii). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has over the 
past decade expanded its activities beyond protection and repatriation to include reintegration 
measures, which include mediation and explicit conflict resolution components. UNDP is now 





initiatives (UNDP, 2001, p.9). Organisations involved in post-war reconstruction are expanding 
their mandates to embrace a wider, more comprehensive approach to building peace from the 
rubble of war.  
 
The grouping of such diverse actors under the label ‘international post-war peacebuilding 
community’ label is not unproblematic. This eclectic group has been here so labelled, not under 
the assumption that they constitute a homogenous entity, nor in the belief that their individual 
agendas are now indistinguishable. Indeed their individual agendas continue to compete in other 
arenas, but in the case of post-war reconstruction there appears to be both a normative and 
practical closeness. The following section explores the growing convergence around the 
definitions and aims of post-war peacebuilding amongst organisations involved in its 
implementation.   
 
4.1  Organisational overview: Some examples of convergent peacebuilding policy 
Below are six examples of what organisations ‘say’ about their role in post-war peacebuilding. It 
gathers data from diverse sources: policy papers, official reports, speeches, meetings agendas and 
resolutions, etc. The varied organisations featured have been chosen to represent six categories 
(military, UN Agency, NGO, Government Development Agency, global financial institution, 
IGO) to facilitate analytical discussion rather than to reflect rigid boundaries between them. The 
definitions of peace given below reveal that previously divergent agendas have given way in the 
past decade to much more consensual approaches to implementing post-settlement reconstruction 
policy.  
 
. NATO describes its mandate in post-war settings as being about building bridges between 





populations, ensuring the safe return of IDPs and refugees that are very effective confidence-
building measures (NATO, 2003). 
 
. UNHCR defines peacebuilding as ‘the process whereby national protection and the rule of law are 
re-established. More specifically, it entails an absence of social and political violence, the 
establishment of effective judicial procedures, the introduction of pluralistic forms of government, 
and the equitable distribution of resources’ (UNHCR 1997, in Chimni, 2002). 
 
. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a large international NGO, believes that peacebuilding must 
engage a holistic approach to interventions that address and transform the root causes of conflict. It 
promotes its explicit peacebuilding agenda by supporting education and training programs, 
engaging in prevention and early warning, promoting peace and justice commissions, supporting 
gender equality, hosting inter-religious dialogues, engaging in cross-divide development initiatives, 
through advocacy and citizen diplomacy, sponsoring research, developing psycho-social and trauma 
healing programs, amongst other activities (Galama and van Tongeren, 2002). 
 
. USAID (Office for Transition Initiatives) lists the following peace-building target issues as being 
key in its post-war interventions: citizen security, reintegration of ex-combatants, mine action, 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), democratic political processes, transparency/good governance, 
civil society development, civilian-military relations, human rights, media, community impact 
activity, women, children and youth. One of its main areas of engagement in peace-building is 
interethnic/interfaith reconciliation, considered a major cornerstone in “building democratic 
institutions, reintegrating communities, healing physical and psychological wounds, and promoting 






. The World Bank defines the aims of its post-war interventions as attempting to rebuild the 
economic and physical infrastructure, strengthening institutional capacity and providing a base for 
sustainable development. Furthermore, it has added demobilisation of soldiers, de-mining and 
displaced population re-integration to its core activities while making ‘peace and social harmony’ 
and integrative objective for its policies and programs. It describes its objectives as “the 
consolidation of peace, the fostering of social reconciliation and the initiation of sustainable 
growth” where it intervenes (Newman and Schnabel, 2002). 
 
. The EU’s vision of peacebuilding entails long-term efforts aimed at preventing armed conflict 
from erupting in the first place by addressing its deep-rooted structural causes. This includes 
broader measures in the political, institutional, economic and developmental fields, such as 
combating poverty, promoting an equitable distribution of resources, pursuing justice and 
reconciliation, upholding the rule of law and human rights, supporting good governance and human 
rights, including accountability and transparency in public decision-making, political pluralism and 
the effective participation of civil society in the peace-building process (EU, 2001). 
 
The arbitrary selection of organisations and the brief sound bites offered makes the above 
somewhat anecdotal, but they do reflect a growing normative and methodological consensus that 
has been comprehensively addressed in the peacebuilding literature (Duffield, 2000, 2002; 
Richmond, 2004a, 2004b; Stiles, 2000; Bush, in Keating and Knight 2004; Knight in Keating and 
Knight 2004; Paris, 2002). For example, Smillie and Helmich have noted a ‘homogenisation’ of 
INGOs (1993, p.23) as a result of convergent approaches and adherence to an increasingly 
standardised peacebuilding delivery package. While Bojicic-Dzelilovic (in Newman and 
Schnabel, 2002, pp.81-98) adds that a dominant development paradigm is drawing diverse 





(2004, p. 25) has noted the ‘commodification of peacebuilding’, as mass-produced initiatives that 
conform to a ‘Northern blueprint’ have become dominant in post-war interventions (ibid, p.24). 
An exploration into the processes behind this growing consensus will support the findings.       
 
4.2.  Explaining organisational convergence around post-war peacebuilding: Why 
is this happening?  
The international post-war peacebuilding community is converging around both pragmatic (1) 
and increasingly ideological (2) principles. 
 
(1) The overall fall of development aid and a growing disengagement from direct bilateral 
assistance by donor Governments, in favour of sub-contracting, has aided this process of 
convergence and cooperation amongst diverse organisations (Duffield, 2002, p.54, p.73). For 
example, donor governments ‘employ’ INGOs as service providers in the field while delegating 
more and more reconstruction activities to the private sector. This donor driven process has 
resulted in closer relationships between state and non-state actors involved in post-war 
peacebuilding. The increasingly coordinated ‘international support system’ is converging around 
a dwindling, centralised and optimised funding flow that has prompted these often-uneasy 
alliances (UNDP, 2001, p.124). The 'homogenisation' of INGOs is partly due to their following 
donor agendas too closely (Smillie and Helmich, 1993) 
 
(2) There is growing support amongst the international peacebuilding community for a global 
system rooted in liberal principles of open economies and open societies, built around democratic 
principles, and offering improved standards of living. This value laden ’liberal democratic peace’ 






4.3.  Exploring the process of organisational convergence: How is this happening? 
The articulation and transformation of the above into convergent policy happens through three 
interlinked processes: growing coordination mechanisms for policy development and 
implementation of peacebuilding programmes (1), the transfer of ’best practice’ through 
evaluation and guidelines (2), and the shaping of global agendas by donor Governments (3).  
 
(1) The UN is driving this process; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has opened several 
post-conflict peacebuilding support offices headed by representatives of the Secretary-General, 
tasked to provide leadership on the development of peace-building strategies. Its Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emerged from the former Department for 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1997, with a strong, field-based capacity for humanitarian 
coordination and uses the Consolidated Appeal Process with increasing success as a planning and 
coordination tool (UNDP, 2001, p.9). The result has been a convergence of actors working in 
post-war situations, with different mandates, operational modalities, and resources forging new 
partnerships and establishing robust coordination systems in the field. This in principle sounds 
good, but these overpowering implementing structures can leave little room in the field for local 
and/or alternative definitions of peacebuilding.  
  
(2) The emphasis in transferring knowledge between organisations involved in peacebuilding 
through field evaluation and consultation has produced influential policy documents such as the 
OECD 1997 Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation; UN 1992/1995 
Agenda for Peace, and the 2000 UN Brahimi Report. However the convergence of criteria of 
what constitutes ‘good’ peacebuilding means that often the same lessons keep being re-learnt and 





(3) Governments shape the global peacebuilding agenda through donor conferences around 
programme areas or specific interventions that impact on the priorities adopted by INGOs, IGOs, 
and other non-state actors. The knock on effect on local NGOs is eventually felt through 
processes such as conditionality of aid or strict funding criteria, thus completing the top-down 
transmission of policy to the grassroots.   
 
4.4.  Challenging this convergence: The theory-practice gap  
There are voices amongst academia who view the rhetorical convergence in peace-building 
amongst financial institutions, donor government, IGOs, and INGOs as masking the contradictory 
aims still pursued in the field (Barakat and Chard, 2002, pp.817-835). The consensus about 
peacebuilding is described by Barakat and Chard (ibid) as representing only agreement about 
what agencies ought to be doing, but not a transformation of approaches in the field. Stiefel (in 
Barakat and Chard, 2002, p.818) adds that despite a growing consensus about peacebuilding, 
inappropriate strategies identified by critical literature in the 80s and 90s are still evident today 
due to the resistance to change within the very same organisations advocating it. However, 
despite continuity of approaches and mistakes, the growing consensus around post-war 
peacebuilding, and the funding rewards for its supporters, is providing a powerful incentive for 
cooperation and coordination in the field. The ‘peacebuilding’ message may be conveyed in a 
more or less cooperative or effective manner in the field, but it is nonetheless conveyed to local 
peacebuilding actors keen to become ‘implementing partners’ to intervening international actors.   
 
Von Hippel also challenges the closeness of these actors, reminding us of their organisational 
distinctiveness. She identifies five ‘international communities’ (2002, pp.714-5) engaged in post-
war peacebuilding: donor governments, militaries, multilateral organisations, private sector, and 





example governments bring resources, militaries bring expertise on violence reduction, and 
NGOs bring specialisation and independence. Von Hippel argues that there may be a consensus 
amongst them on general aims, such as a general preference of peace, democracy and economic 
development over war, authoritarianism and poverty, but beyond that crucial differences emerge. 
These ‘communities’ enter the field with different missions, organisational cultures, sources of 
support, and dominant constituencies (ibid). However, despite distinct agendas and mandates of 
organisations Von Hippel ignores a crucial factor driving coordination and consensual 
approaches: that of funding and ultimate political control by donor governments of all the 
organisations involved. This separation of ‘communities’ is unrealistic when in fact governments 
are the main donors for multilateral organisations and NGOs, while being the political authority 
that controls the military.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The growing consensus about post-war peacebuilding being an effective way of reducing violent 
conflict, promoting political stability and supporting longer-term development and global security 
goals has forced both observers and practitioners to define and articulate a ‘model’ of good post-
war peacebuilding theory and practice. This paper has highlighted the principled and practical 
‘problems’ of such growing convergence.  
 
The principled problems of the discussed consensus relate to the message the growing consensus 
sends to policymakers, donors and the field. The blooming peacebuilding literature delivers a 
convergence around aims and approaches, at the expense of a critical examination of the values 
and principles underpinning these interventions. The strong ideological message travelling to the 
field embedded into the structures of coordination and implementation to be found in places such 





critiques offered by authors such as Chandler (1999a, 1999b, 2004) Paris (1997, 2001, 2002), or 
Duffield (1998, 2000, 2002) are weak on feasible alternatives, but are correct in ‘naming and 
shaming’ the implicit support of the liberal democratic peace project so vigorously promoted by 
the Western Powers. The current Iraq intervention and the ‘global war on terror’ present an 
unavoidable challenge to peacebuilding and conflict resolution researchers and implementing 
agencies, as post-war peacebuilding becomes the ‘reward’ or carrot used to legitimise 
controversial military intervention.  
 
The practical problems relate to finding an operational definition of post-war peacebuilding that 
enables conflict transformation instruments and processes to be mainstreamed into reconstruction 
activities such as democratisation, demilitarisation, and economic reform. One argument 
emphasises the worth of keeping the conceptualisation of post-war peacebuilding broad to enable 
implementers to coherently integrate the diverse activities that may contribute to peace (See 
Section 3.5). However, this holistic approach, which defines peacebuilding as a guiding aim, 
remains insufficient because in practice it often means adding the term as an afterthought: 
attaching a peacebuilding label to well-established practices.  
 
Post-war peacebuilding must become an applicable concept, to enable mainstreaming into 
programming in the field as well as into policy, and to stop it becoming little more than ‘good 
intentions’. However, it must also move beyond the technical to encompass and explicitly convey 
for scrutiny the principles and values that unavoidably underpin peacebuilding interventions. To 
‘earn’ the label of peacebuilding, agencies engaged in post-war intervention must adhere to a 
four-dimensional definition of peacebuilding encompassing: (1) An explicit and transparent aim 
and intention to build a positive peace, (2) a recognisable and contextualised set of activities that 





implementation approach based on ‘real’ participation and inclusion of local peacebuilders, and 
finally (4) a measurable peacebuilding ‘impact’. Post-war peacebuilding both in theory and in 
practice must be about intentions, means and ends and it must own up to all three to re-claim its 
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